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to the Greek original and to one another, may perhaps also be determined with the aid of this fragment, which corresponds to Book iv, chaps. 9-14, with about half of 15, of the Latin text. The remaining literary papyri contain fragments of medical, astronomical and astrological works, a magical charm, and two acrostics.

Since the papyri contained in this volume are of comparatively late date, the documents published represent for the most part types already made familiar through previous publications, such as official documents, contracts, receipts, and private letters. Some of these are interesting, but most of them add little to our knowledge. Two series of documents are, however, of considerable importance. The first relates to the priests of Soknebtunis and the second to taxation. These documents contain much information concerning the relations of the priests to the state and the details of the system by which the state derived its revenue.

In addition to the papyri which are published in full, with introductions and notes, 265 less important fragments are described with more or less complete publication of their text, and twenty ostraca are published. A first appendix contains the text, with introduction and notes, of a papyrus in the British Museum (P. 372), which dates from the second century of our era and gives directions for the calculation of various taxes. A second appendix, "The Topography of the Arsinoite Nome," supplements and corrects in some particulars Wessely's *Topographie des Faijûm* (Vienna, 1904). The volume is supplied with full indices, chiefly the work of Professor Goodspeed. The editors have performed their task with the greatest industry, learning, and acumen. The texts are most carefully published, and in the introductions, translations, and notes the reader finds the information necessary to an immediate understanding of the text and also such references to other material and to the work of other scholars as may assist him in further investigation. The volume contains even more than can reasonably be demanded in a first publication of new material.

HAROLD N. FOWLER

The Greatness and Decline of Rome. By GUGLIELMO FERRERO; translated by ALFRED E. ZIMMERN. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907. Vols. I. and II. Pp. vi+328; vi+389. \$5.25 net.

The thesis of Sig. Ferrero's *Grandezza e Decadenza di Roma*, the first two volumes of which have been translated by Mr. Zimmern, is that the Roman world-conquest was the effect of an internal transformation which is continually being re-enacted in the history of societies on a larger or a smaller scale, namely the growth of a national and mercantile democracy on the ruins of a federation of agricultural aristocracies. In accordance with this, the first volume, "The Empire Builders" ("La

Conquista dell' Impero"), begins with the death of Sulla, when "in place of a number of small federal republics, there was a single Italian nation, with an agriculture, a commerce, an army, a civilization of its own." Rome was ready to begin the conquest of the world.

The new policy was initiated by Lucullus, "the Napoleon of the last century of the Republic," whose brilliant and sensational conquests have appealed strongly to the imagination of Sig. Ferrero. He has realized, as perhaps no one before him, the significance of Lucullus' eastern campaigns, and the importance of his policy of personal initiative, which led him to embark on a career of external conquest, hitherto undreamed of by the conservative and short-sighted commanders of Roman armies. The author, too, has been the first to appreciate fully the influence of economic conditions on the politics of this period, for he rightly attributes the recall of Lucullus to a general movement induced by hard times, and skilfully used by an unscrupulous rival. For it was Pompey who was at once the underhand opponent of Lucullus and his aptest pupil. Lacking in real originality, he was quick to use the ideas of men of genius, and realizing the significance of Lucullus' conquests, he determined to oust their originator and complete them himself.

During Pompey's absence in the East Crassus and Caesar became the leaders of the democratic party. Sig. Ferrero is inclined to believe, with Mommsen, that these two men took part in the conspiracy of Sulla and Autronius, hoping to secure the consuls of 65 as allies in their plans. He holds, however, that they took no part in the communistic plans of Catiline. This conspiracy is shown to have thus been doomed to failure, but the effect of its suppression on Roman politics is represented as far-reaching. Respectable citizens rallied around the small band of conservatives, and democracy under Caesar's leadership became a party of social discontent.

This was the party which used the Bona Dea scandal to increase its own power; for Clodius was acquitted by means of the money of Crassus, distributed to the jurors at Caesar's request. But this future henchman of the democratic leaders could not have been the moral degenerate (*pazzo morale*) that Sig. Ferrero's knowledge of the criminally insane has caused him to portray. Such a man would not have been active and clever enough to be worth the money and trouble spent in securing him for the party.

Similarly, the author has failed to see the real cause of Clodius' persecution of Cicero. Taking as his foundation a bit of gossip recorded by Plutarch (*Cic.* 29), he seeks to prove that the orator, urged on by his wife, advocated the bill directed against Clodius and thereby incurred the latter's enmity. But for this there is no authority. Cicero's participation in the case was confined to his testimony, which broke down the defendant's plea of alibi and in spite of which he was acquitted. Clodius

attack on Cicero had, then, a deeper root. A general campaign against the conservatives was to be undertaken, and an important part of it would consist in discrediting and banishing the already unpopular consul who had superintended the execution of the Catilinarians.

This attack upon the conservatives was to be made by a new democratic party, modeled, according to Sig. Ferrero, after the moderate democracy of 70, but transformed by Caesar, after the success of his land bill of 59, into a pure democracy, in which the senate was to play no part. The policy of the triumvirs was to be carried out by means of organized voters in the popular assembly. This organization, managed by Clodius, has been strikingly called by Sig. Ferrero the Tammany Hall of Rome. Political clubs were founded, and an electoral army recruited from the poorer voters, which, thanks to Clodius' corn law, was maintained by the government, and was entirely at the service of the democratic leaders. The refined and the educated retired from public life to the quieter and more congenial pursuits of agriculture and literature, and "Roman politics became a world-wide market for laws and appointments, kingdoms and provinces, privileges and disreputable deals: full of intrigue and swindling, treachery and violence."

The second volume, which bears the title "Julius Caesar," begins with the war in Gaul—Caesar's attempt to carry out the policy of imperialism. The author rightly emphasizes the fact that Caesar, eager to follow in the footsteps of Lucullus and Pompey, must win a conspicuous victory if he was to hold the political superiority which he had gained, and shows that it was for this reason that the attack was made upon the Helvetians. He also points out the absurdity of the rumors about this tribe, which were current at Rome, and which had led the Romans to believe that Italy was in danger of a new invasion by northern barbarians, and shows clearly that this movement was merely a great *trek* on the part of this mountain people into the fertile plains of Gaul. Caesar's unprovoked attack on them was therefore a great blunder.

The subsequent career of Caesar in Gaul is described with clearness and vividness. Sig. Ferrero, while appreciating the brilliance of the proconsul, points out his mistakes—the premature annexation of the country in 57, which is shown to have been merely a political maneuver, the attempted alliance with the Gallic nationalist party, which alienated his old friends and failed to gain him new ones, and especially his policy of bloody extermination, which resulted in the general rebellion led by Vercingetorix.

Meanwhile at Rome a reaction had set in against the imperialistic policy of the leaders of the democrats, particularly among the new middle class of land-owners, who had risen to moderate wealth by success in agriculture and industrial occupations. Especially after the disaster at Carrhae men were inclined to make Caesar the scapegoat both for

defeat abroad and anarchy at home. In 51 he was entirely discredited, "the man best hated and most despised by the upper classes" (Italian version, II, p. 250). This attitude was shared, in part at least, by Pompey, whose estrangement from Caesar Sig. Ferrero attributes to a difference between the temperaments, rather than the ambitions, of the two men. It was impossible for conservative and radical to continue to work together.

In his account of the Civil War Sig. Ferrero is perhaps at his best. He has used his powers of description to give a vivid account of the panic which broke out in the capital when the news was brought that Caesar had invaded Italy, and of the financial crisis which followed the departure of Pompey and the conservatives. His portrayal of the characters of the two leaders is a natural reaction against Mommsen's. Pompey is indeed arrogant, and hesitating and obstinate by turns, yet "not a fool, as several modern historians in their enthusiasm for Caesar have been pleased to call him, but a typical and intelligent aristocrat, with all the faults and all the virtues of the old nobility, a man upon whom the times had imposed a task which was far beyond his powers." On the other hand, while he depicts the marvelous keenness, the boundless energy, and the extraordinary daring of Caesar, he is not blind to his many acts of foolhardiness, and does not spare his criticisms when the victorious leader lingered for months at Alexandria, greatly to the damage of his cause and the discouragement of his followers. The author also appreciates the difficulty of Caesar's position in Rome after his return from Africa in 46, and the futility of his magnificent plans, none of which could set the dictatorship upon a firm basis and establish a new order of things. For Caesar, says Sig. Ferrero, though a great general, a great writer, a great character, was not a great statesman. He was the greatest demagogue of history, in whom were embodied all the revolutionary forces, magnificent and awful, of a mercantile age in conflict with the traditions of an old-time agricultural society.

To those who read in this history of the world-power first made possible by the establishment of a mercantile democracy, of the enormous influence of financiers and financial situations upon politicians and politics, of selfish ends converted into party issues, the resemblance between Rome and our own times will recur with redoubled force. There is danger, to be sure, that the historian, on account of his intimate acquaintance with the politics of modern Europe, will read our present-day conditions into times when they did not in reality exist, yet surely he is justified in drawing many parallels between the selfishness of Rome and the commercialism of our own day, and the result has proved to be a work unexcelled in vividness and interest by any history of Rome.

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